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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in 
refusing to modify the child custody provision at issue based 
upon the Court's finding that Plaintiff-Appellant ("Mr. Walton") 
had not established a substantial change of circumstance? 
On appeal, Mr. Walton bears the burden to prove that 
the Trial Court abused its broad discretion in denying his 
petition to modify the custody award to Defendant-Appellee ("Ms. 
Walton") or that the Court' s refusal to modify is manifestly 
unjust. See, e. g. , Maughan v. Maucrhan, 770 P. 2d 156, 159 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) and Fullmer v. Fullmer. 761 P. 2d 942, 945 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
2. Does the record on appeal compel this Court to 
find that the best interests of the Walton children would be 
served by granting Mr. Walton' s petition to modify custody or to 
remand the matter to the Trial Court for further consideration? 
The standard of judicial review with regard to this 
issue is the same as issue 1 above. 
-2-
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3. Did the Trial Court err in finding that Mr. Walton 
failed to establish a substantial change of circumstance 
justifying a modification of custody? 
Appellate courts will not set aside a trial court' s 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and the 
challenging party has marshaled the evidence. See, e, a. , 
Mauahan, 776 P. 2d at 922; and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
52(a). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules, or regulations which are determinative to any 
issue in this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Except as described below, Ms. Walton does not dispute 
the statement of facts in Mr. Walton' s brief. However, Mr. 
Walton' s statement of facts must be supplemented as set forth 
below to accurately reflect the record on appeal. 
1. The testimony and report of Ms. Linda Hunt, who 
performed a custody evaluation in this matter, clearly 
establishes that Ms. Walton does "a very good job in her 
parenting skills" and Ms. Hunt' s recommendation that custody be 
modified in Mr. Walton's favor was "very difficult" and a "close 
-3-
g:\wpl\194\00000sp3.W51 
call.11 (Transcript of Proceedings, pp. 62-3). Ms. Hunt further 
testified that Ms. Walton spends quality time with and expresses 
considerable care and love for her children, and that Ms. Hunt is 
"very much impressed with the parenting skills, personal growth 
and accomplishment of [Ms. ] Walton. " (Tr. pp. 63-5; Custody 
Evaluation Report, pp. 9, 12). 
2. The Walton children are thriving emotionally and 
doing well in school under Ms. Walton' s custody, and there is no 
evidence whatsoever that the present custodial arrangement is 
harmful or destructive to the children' s emotional and physical 
growth, development, or well being. (Tr. pp. 67-8, 112). 
3. Ms. Hunt testified she found no evidence that Ms. 
Walton has drinking, smoking, or morality problems, and Ms. 
Walton is continuing the childrens' religious upbringing. (Tr. 
pp. 64, 70). Ms. Hunt further testified that Ms. Walton was 
mentally and physically able to meet the needs of the children, 
and that the children were very well adjusted. (Tr. pp. 71-2). 
4. With regard to Mr. Walton' s assertion that the 
children have been exposed to acts of violence under their 
present living arrangements and are frightened, the record 
contains no testimony to that effect except for the fact that a 
little boy living in the same apartment complex once "bullied" 
-4-
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the Walton children, but that situation has been resolved, and no 
physical harm Lo che Walton children has occurred. in. pp. 102-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO MODIFY THE PRESENT CUSTODIAL 
ARRANGEMENT BASED ON ITS FINDING THAT MR. 
WALTON FAILED TO PROVE A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE 
OF CIRCUMSTANCE. 
1. Mr. Walton Failed to Raise Before the Trial Court 
the Argument He Raises Here. 
Mr. Walton' s primary argument on appeal is that the 
Trial Court abused its discretion in requiring him to prove a 
substantial change of circumstance as a prerequisite to modifying 
the present custody arrangement. Mr. Walton asserts that because 
the custody arrangement in this case was based on a stipulation 
the Trial Court must necessarily employ a "flexible" approach to 
the change of circumstance requirement, and receive evidence1 of 
and make findings with regard to the best interests of the 
children. (Appellant's Brief, p. 10-11). However, the record on 
appeal contains no hint that Mr. Walton urged the Trial Court to 
apply such a flexible approach. Mr. Walton' s post-hearing 
memorandum to the Trial Court on the issue of child custody did 
not raise this argument nor did it cite or discuss the cases Mr. 
!The Trial Court did in fact receive evidence regarding the 
best interests of the children over the objection of Ms. Walton's 
counsel that a change of circumstance had not yet been 
established. The Trial Court received all of the evidence Mr. 
Walton offered, and no error can be assigned in this regard. 
-6-
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2. The Change of Circumstance Rule. 
It is well established that a party seeking to modify a 
divorce decree, including a child custody award, must first 
establish that a change of circumstance has occurred subsequent 
to the entry of the decree which merits reopening previously 
resolved issues. See, e. a. , Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P. 2d 624, 626 
(Utah 1987). The change of circumstance threshold is intended to 
discourage frequent petitions for modification of custody by the 
noncustodial parent where a change is not clearly justified, to 
protect the custodial parent from harassing and repeated 
litigation, and to protect the child from unstabilizing "ping-
pong" custody arrangements. The rule essentially creates a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of maintaining custody 
arrangements in order to enhance the stability of a child. See, 
e. a. , Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P. 2d 599, 606 (Utah 1989) (Durham, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
However, Utah Courts began to identify problems with 
and became critical of the strict application of the rule under 
all circumstances. Courts reasoned that since the ultimate 
objective of a child custody award is to enhance the best 
interests of the child, the change of circumstance rule should 
not preclude a modification where the child is in a marginal or 
-8-
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alleged changed circumstances of one or the 
other of the parents may result in great harm 
to a child. That does not mean that a change 
of custody should be made when it is shown 
that one parent is marginally better than 
another, but it does mean that a trial nudge 
should not focus exclusively on factors apart 
from the best interests of the children and 
ignore all evidence pertaining to the 
children7 s welfare in a hearing on changed 
circumstances. 
Kramer, 738 P. 2d at 628-29 (Stewart, J. , concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
Justice Howe, concurring with the Kramer majority, also 
wrote that in his view the change of circumstance rule should not 
be as rigidly applied if, for example, the initial custody decree 
was based on the fact that both parents were only marginally fit 
or where the initial award was based on an unlitigated decree. 
However, Justice Howe affirmed that the underlying justification 
for the flexible approach is to insure that a child will "not be 
subjected to spending the rest of his or her minority in an 
inferior environment because of the inaction of one parent at the 
time custody is awarded. " I&. at 629 (Howe, J. , concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, from the inception of the flexible approach it 
has always b€*en clear that the factor triggering its application 
is the inferior or destructive nature of the present custodial 
•10-
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arrangement, not merely that the decree was unadjudicated, as Mr. 
Walton asserts. The flexible approach simply relaxes the 
evidentiary and procedural restrictions placed on a trial court 
by the change of circumstance rule, allowing the court to 
determine if in fact the present custody arrangement is inimical 
to the child. 
Cases subsequent to Kramer have clearly articulated 
that the strict change of circumstance threshold gives way to the 
flexible approach only if it appears the present custodial 
relationship is marginal or destructive to the child. Mr. Walton 
cites no authority holding that the flexible approach must be 
applied in all cases simply because the prior award was 
unadjudicated, and he cites no case where a trial court's refusal 
to modify an award has been overturned for failure to apply the 
flexible approach. In fact, the reported cases reach the 
opposite result. 
In Maughan v. Mauahan, 770 P. 2d 156, 160 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), the noncustodial father petitioned for modification of a 
stipulated custody arrangement. The trial court, rigidly 
applying the change of circumstance rule, denied the petition 
based upon the father' s failure to prove a substantial change in 
the custodial parent' s parenting ability or in the custodial 
-11-
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arrangement, and the father appealed. I_d. at 158-9. The Court 
of Appeals acknowledged that under Hoaae v. Hoaae, 649 P. 2d 51 
(Utah 1982), Kramer, and Fullmer, a trial court has great 
latitude in applying the change of circumstance rule and may 
inquire into the best interests of the children where the decree 
is stipulated. id. at 160. Under such facts, "the trial court, 
at its discretion, fis 1 permitted to inquire into ' the effects on 
the child of the established custodial relationship as it has 
developed over time. ' " Id. at 160 (emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court' s denial 
of the father's petition for modification "even under this less 
rigid legal standard" because the denial was not "so flagrantly 
unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion. " Ijd. The facts 
of the present case, both procedurally and substantively, are 
almost identical to Mauahan and also compel an affirmative. 
In Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P. 2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), the Court of Appeals held that even if the initial custody 
award is stipulated, a strict application of the change of 
circumstances rule is appropriate where the present custodial 
arrangement is not marginal or destructive, and that a trial 
court does abuse its discretion in not strictly applying the 
change in circumstance rule in such a situation. Cf. Elmer v. 
-12-
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Elmer, 776 P. 2d 599, 504 (Utah 1989) (the principle of stability 
should not be allowed to protect a parent who is indifferent to 
or destructive of the child's welfare). 
As discussed below, the evidence clearly establishes 
that Ms. Walton is a very good parent and that the children are 
thriving under her care in every sense. Thus, Mr. Walton has 
failed to demonstrate that the Trial Court erred in applying the 
change of circumstance requirement, and "where the children 
appear to be comparatively well adjusted and happy, they should 
not be compelled to change their home unless there appears some 
substantial reason for doing so. " Hoaae v. Hoaae. 649 P. 2d 51, 
55 (Utah 1982) (quoting Trego v. Trego, 565 P. 2d at 75). This 
Court should affirm. 
POINT II: THE RECORD ON APPEAL DOES NOT AND WILL NOT 
SUPPORT A FINDING THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN FOR THE 
PRESENT CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT TO BE MODIFIED. 
Mr. Walton urges this Court to either remand this 
matter to the Trial Court with instructions to expressly consider 
and enter findings regarding the best interests of the children 
or for this Court to reverse the Trial Court and enter its own 
findings supporting the modification Mr. Walton seeks. Mr. 
Walton is not entitled to either form of relief. 
-13-
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First, even if the Court holds that the Trial Court 
abused its discretion in its application of the change of 
circumstances rule, this error is harmless. The facts in the 
record, as discussed below, are clear, uncontroverted, and are 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of maintaining the 
existing custody arrangement, whether this result is based on Mr. 
Walton' s failure to prove a change of circumstance, as the Trial 
Court held, or the failure of the evidence to overcome the 
presumption that a modification in custody is not in the best 
interests of the children. See, e. g. , Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P. 2d 
917, 924 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (failure of trial court to enter 
findings on material issue will not require remand if the record 
is clear, uncontroverted, and only capable of supporting an 
affirmance). 
A close examination of the record evidence upon which 
Mr. Walton relies in claiming that the best interests of the 
children would be "greatly benefitted" by changing their custody 
to him demonstrates the tenuous if not frivolous nature of his 
position. These factors can be summarized generally as follows: 
(1) Mr. Walton's financial condition is better than Ms. Walton's 
condition; (2) Ms. Walton cannot provide a male role model for 
the children; (3) Ms. Walton desires custody only so she can 
-14-
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receive child support; (4) Ms. Walton is going to school full 
time and places the children in day care; and (5) the housing 
arrangements Mr. Walton could provide are more desirable than 
those provided by Ms. Walton. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-16). 
This evidence does not provide a legal basis for modifying an 
existing custody arrangement under any standard. In fact, the 
Trial Court would abuse its discretion if it did grant Mr. 
Walton' s petition based on this evidence. 
In Fullmer, 761 P. 2d 942, involving circumstances 
remarkably similar to the present case, the trial court granted 
the father' s petition to modify a stipulated custody award to the 
mother based on the court' s finding that a change in circumstance 
had been proved. The father sought the modification because 
after the divorce the mother had to work full time and place the 
child in day care. On the other hand, the father had remarried 
and established a stable home while the mother moved 
occasionally. The custody evaluator testified that the child was 
well adjusted and that both parties were good parents. The 
evaluator also characterized his recommendation to change custody 
from the mother to the father as Ma close call" based upon the 
father' s solid employment and more stable home environment. I_d. 
at 944-45. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court' s order 
-15-
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of modification, holding that the court abused its discretion in 
failing to strictly adhere to the change of circumstance rule, 
and also 
by relying on [the child's] placement in 
full-time day care to change his custody 
placement. [The mother] had no choice but to 
work full-time in order to adequately support 
[the child] and herself. In this era, more 
and more children are raised by single 
parents who must work. . . . Day care is a 
reality and we find no basis in the facts of 
this case or any scholarly authority cited to 
support the trial court' s conclusion that day 
cai:e is per se less advantageous than a step 
mother custodian. 
Id. at 948. The Court of Appeals stated that the "flexible" 
approach suggested by Justice Stewart and Justice Howe in Kramer 
was not appropriate in Fullmer because adherence to the strict 
change of circumstance rule would not leave the child in a 
"marginal situation." Id. at 94 7. 
Similarly, the Trial Court' s denial of Mr. Walton' s 
petition will not leave the Walton children in a marginal 
situation. If the Trial Court in this matter would have modified 
the child custody arrangement based upon the evidence adduced by 
Mr. Walton, Fullmer would compel a reversal by this Court. 
Mr. Walton' s assertion that he is financially more able 
to provide for the children' s needs is also insufficient to 
justify a change in custody. Mr. Walton has previously sought to 
-16-
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modify his alimony and child support obligations as well as the 
$2,500 annual marital property settlement he must pay Ms. Walton. 
The Trial Court did in fact reduce Mr. Walton' s alimony and child 
support obligations, but refused to modify the property 
settlement. Nonetheless, Mr. Walton has failed and refused to 
pay the $2,500 annual marital settlement installments, which have 
now accrued in the sum of $10, 000. Apparently, Mr. Walton' s 
financial condition is subject to change as it best suits him. 
Mr. Walton is financially unable to meet his obligations to Ms. 
Walton when those obligations are due, but Mr. Walton is 
financially able to provide a better environment than Ms. Walton 
for their children when custody is at issue. As Judge Billings 
noted in Fullmer, "it is anomalous for a divorced noncustodial 
parent to complain about a high child support and alimony award, 
succeed in lowering the amount, and then argue that because the 
custodial parent must work to support the child and him or 
herself there is grounds for a change in custody." Fullmer, 761 
P. 2d at 948, n. 3. Similarly, if Mr. Walton would simply comply 
with his financial obligations to Ms. Walton under the Divorce 
Decree, she too would perhaps be able to purchase a home in a 
nice rural area and provide the children with allowances, Nikes 
and Nintendo. Utah law should not and does not allow the system 
-17-
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to be manipulated by a noncustodial parent as Mr. Walton attempts 
to do here, and this Court should disregard the financial status 
of the parties on this basis alone. 
The fact that Ms. Walton spends time outside the home 
attending school in order to improve her circumstances and those 
of her children is also insufficient to justify modification of 
custody. In Maughan, this Court cited with approval the 
following reasoning by the trial court in denying the father' s 
petition to modify custody: 
A single parent who has to take what 
employment they can get certainly has more 
difficulty as opposed to dual parents. The 
single has to arrange schedules, child care, 
perform all the household tasks, that are 
necessary. The court does not feel that the 
[custodial parent] should be penalized 
because of this kind of a situation where she 
does not have the same financial abilities as 
the [noncustodial parent] in order to provide 
a stable environment. The fact that the 
[noncustodial parent] remarried making this a 
dual parent household is not such a 
substantial change of circumstances that 
would merit a change of custody or simply any 
remarriage would have the ping-pong effect on 
child custody. 
770 P. 2d at 161. It would be manifestly unjust to penalize Ms. 
Walton by taking custody of her children away from her on the 
grounds that her attendance at school, an effort to make their 
lives better, is not in her childrens' best interest. Ms. Walton 
-18-
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and other custodial parents should be supported and encouraged to 
better themselves in this fashion, not penalized and discouraged. 
Finally, Mr. Walton' s contention that he should be 
granted custody so he can provide a proper male role model for 
the boys is also insufficient. Apparently, Mr. Walton suggests 
that at some point during a male child' s life a father should be 
favored over a mother due to his gender. There is absolutely no 
legal support for such a position. Further, Mr. Walton' s 
assertions that Ms. Walton wishes to maintain custody of her 
children only because of the child support she gets is entirely 
unsupported by the record and irrelevant. Ms. Hunt, the custody 
evaluator, testified that in her view Ms. Walton was a very 
loving and caring parent. As Ms. Walton testified at the 
hearing, while it is understandably important that she maintain 
her current level of income, including child support and alimony, 
she is not putting that above raising her children. (Tr. p. 98). 
Thus, there is simply no evidence in the record which 
would support any finding other than that Mr. Walton has failed 
to demonstrate any legal basis for modifying the present custody 
arrangement. 
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POINT III: MR. WALTON HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
AND THEREFORE HIS CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL 
COURT' S FINDINGS ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
A party who wishes to challenge a trial court' s 
findings of fact on appeal must marshal the evidence. See, e.g., 
Scharf v. BMG Corn. , 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Mr. Walton 
attempts to avoid this obligation by asserting "a review of the 
record fails to disclose facts which the Court could rely upon to 
articulate justification for a finding that there was no change 
in circumstance." (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). To the contrary, 
the record bears ample evidence to support the Trial Court' s 
finding and this Court should refuse to consider Mr. Walton' s 
challenge to any of the findings for failing to marshal that 
evidence. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Walton asserts that this 
appeal is frivolous under the clear mandates set forth by this 
Court in Maughan and Fullmer. Accordingly, as a result of having 
to defend this appeal Ms. Walton requests an award of reasonable 
attorney fees against Mr. Walton pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Alternatively, Ms. Walton requests 
an award of fees under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989). The 
financial need of Ms. Walton and disparity in the parties' 
-20-
g:\wpl\194\00000sp3.W51 
financial resources is most aptly demonstrated by Mr. Walton' s 
own argument that this Court should modify custody based on his 
superior financial resources. See Mauahan, 770 P. 2d at 162-3. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Walton has failed to prove that the Trial Court 
abused its discretion in applying the change of circumstance rule 
in denying his petition to modify custody. Mauahan and Fullmer 
clearly demonstrate that the Trial Court did not abuse its 
discretion. Further, Mr. Walton7 s argument miscontrues Utah law 
and was not raised below. Finally, even if this Court concludes 
that the Trial Court erred in its application of the change of 
circumstance requirement, that error is harmless because the 
evidence does not establish that the best interests of the 
children would be served by a change in custody. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this p 7 ^ \ day of February, 
1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
endant-Appellee 
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